Copyright 2015 by Alyssa Markenson

Printed in U.S.A.
Vol. 109, No. 1

WHAT’S AT STAKE?: BLUMAN V. FEDERAL
ELECTION COMMISSION AND THE
INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE STAKE-BASED
IMMIGRATION PLENARY POWER AND
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Alyssa Markenson
ABSTRACT—Section 441e of the U.S. Code prohibits “foreign
nationals”—all noncitizens except lawful permanent residents—from
making any contribution or expenditure in any federal, state, or local
election. In Bluman v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme Court
summarily affirmed a three-judge district court’s decision to uphold the law
based on the government’s compelling interest in preventing foreign
influence over U.S. elections. Notably, Bluman’s holding was animated by
its reasoning that the extent of First Amendment protection should be
directly tied to the aliens’ stake in American society—a reflection of the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence since the middle of the twentieth century
that seeks to accord constitutional rights to noncitizens based on their stake
in society, also known as the “stake theory.” By contrast, during the end of
the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the Supreme Court
focused not on an alien’s stake, but on his location—so long as an alien
was within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States he was entitled to
constitutional protection. This Note argues that the First Amendment’s
identity-neutral guarantee of freedom of speech is incompatible with the
stake theory. In the context of freedom of speech and independent
expenditures, denying First Amendment protection because of the
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INTRODUCTION
Benjamin Bluman, a Canadian citizen, had been lawfully residing in
the United States for nearly five years and wanted to create and distribute
flyers in support of President Obama; Asenath Steiman, a dual citizen of
Canada and Israel, was living in the United States on a three-year visa
(extendable up to seven years) and sought to make expenditures to several
conservative political action committees.1 In 2010, Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission struck down a prohibition on corporate
independent expenditures, emphasizing that bans based solely on the
speaker’s identity violate the First Amendment.2 Despite Citizens United’s
reasoning and Bluman and Steiman’s long-term connections to the United
States, they were prohibited from making campaign expenditures for one
reason: they were admitted to the United States on nonimmigrant visas.3
The Immigration and Nationality Act generally divides aliens into two
categories: immigrants and nonimmigrants.4 Immigrants, usually referred to
as lawful permanent residents (LPRs), are entitled to reside in the United

1

Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 285 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012).
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
3
See 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2012).
4
An “immigrant” is defined as “every alien except an alien [in one of the enumerated
nonimmigrant classes].” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2012).
2
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States permanently, subject to a few conditions.5 Conversely,
nonimmigrants are aliens admitted on temporary visas.6 Although these
visas are “temporary,” the term may be misleading because many
nonimmigrant visas last for several years.7
Section 441e of the U.S. Code prohibits “foreign nationals”—defined
as all noncitizens except LPRs—from making both campaign contributions
and expenditures in any federal, state, or local election (including local
elections in which they can vote).8 A three-judge district court panel upheld
the ban in Bluman v. FEC, which the Supreme Court summarily affirmed.9
Applying strict scrutiny, the district court concluded the federal
government has a compelling interest in preventing foreign influence over
the political process.10 More interestingly, the court reasoned that § 441e is
narrowly tailored to that interest because it does not extend to LPRs.11
Specifically, Bluman contended that nonimmigrants do not have a
sufficient stake in the United States because of their temporary status;
LPRs, however, are entitled to the First Amendment right to make
expenditures and contributions because of their “long-term stake in the
flourishing of American society.”12 Indeed, the opinion warned that
“extend[ing] the current statutory ban to lawful permanent residents who
have a more significant attachment to the United States . . . would raise
substantial questions not raised by this case.”13 Thus, the extent of aliens’
First Amendment protection was directly tied to their stake in society,
despite their lawful presence within the United States.
5

See id. § 1101(a)(20). Immigrant visas are allocated through two main channels: the family-based
preference categories (certain family members of LPRs or U.S. citizens), id. § 1153(a), and the
employment-based categories, id. § 1153(b). Additionally, 55,000 visas are distributed through the
diversity lottery among countries with a low rate of immigration to the United States. Id. § 1153(c).
Wait times for an immigrant visa can be exorbitant; for example, some categories have an estimated
backlog of twenty-four years. See Visa Bulletin – Immigration Numbers for January 2014, U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS 2 (Dec. 11, 2013), http://travel.state.gov/
content/dam/visas/Bulletins/visabulletin_january2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/E7BN-MBBA].
6
There are numerous classes of nonimmigrants, including, for example, tourists, students, and
certain skilled and unskilled employees. See § 1101(a)(15)(B), (F), (J).
7
For example, nonimmigrants on H-1B visas can be admitted up to three years and can extend their
visa up to six years. Id. § 1184(g)(4). Further, the visa can be extended beyond the six-year maximum if
an application for labor certification and adjustment of status to LPR has been pending for more than a
year. American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act, Pub. L. No. 106-313, § 106, 114 Stat.
1251, 1253–54 (2000); see also 8 C.F.R. § 214.6(h)(iv) (2014) (noting “no specific limit on the total
period of time an alien may be in TN status”); id. § 214.1(c)(3) (specifying the classes of
nonimmigrants ineligible for extensions of stay).
8
2 U.S.C. § 441e (2012).
9
800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012).
10
Id. at 285–86, 288.
11
Id. at 291.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 292.

211

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Bluman’s emphasis on an alien’s stake is not surprising given the
Court’s shift over the last several decades toward a stake-based theory in
immigration cases.14 Through its plenary power over immigration, the
federal government has extensive authority to regulate immigration—
including rules regarding admission and deportation of aliens—subject to
few constitutional limitations and little judicial intervention.15 But this
authority often leads to harsh results, especially for LPRs. To limit the
reach of the plenary power and provide protection for LPRs, the Court has
shifted toward granting constitutional rights to aliens based on their stake in
the country.
Emphasizing nonimmigrants’ stake, however, conflicts with the
Court’s cases evaluating limits on independent expenditures. Independent
expenditures involve money spent “expressly advocating the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate,” in which no coordination with the
candidate was involved.16 Importantly, independent expenditures are
considered the equivalent of political speech; the fact that money must be
spent does not affect their nature as political speech or lessen “the exacting
scrutiny required by the First Amendment.”17
In Citizens United, the Court struck down a ban on corporate
independent expenditures primarily because Congress cannot restrict
political speech based on the speaker’s identity.18 Citizens United further
emphasized that bans on independent expenditures effectively censor
political speech and arbitrarily stymie the free marketplace of ideas.19 At
bottom, the reasoning in Citizens United is fundamentally a limit on
governmental authority that contradicts the notion that one needs a stake in
order to be protected by the First Amendment.
Thus, Bluman is significant not because of its holding, but rather
because it illustrates how the plenary power’s emphasis on stake has
14

See infra Part I.
See infra Part I.
16
2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2012). Campaign finance laws distinguish between contributions and
expenditures. Contributions are made directly to a candidate or political committee. Id. § 431(8). If
expenditures are coordinated with the candidate, they are treated as contributions. Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 46 (1976) (per curiam). Expenditures include money given by an individual to an outside
group. See § 431(17)(B). This Note focuses on independent expenditures, rather than contributions,
because the tension is starker. In particular, limits bear upon slightly different First Amendment values:
contributions impinge upon freedom of expression and of association, whereas expenditures are
considered speech. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20–23, 39. Accordingly, limits on contributions are
analyzed under heightened scrutiny, but expenditures receive strict scrutiny. Id. at 25, 44. Bluman
seemingly recognized this distinction when the opinion stated that it would be “a wise approach” to
“argue . . . that [the plaintiffs] may have a right to make expenditures even if they do not have a right to
make contributions.” 800 F. Supp. 2d at 288 n.3.
17
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16.
18
558 U.S. 310, 349 (2010); see infra Part II.B.
19
See infra Part II.C.
15
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complicated First Amendment doctrine. Bluman effectively permitted the
stake-based theory of immigration law to permeate freedom of speech
jurisprudence despite the substantial tension between the stake-based
immigration plenary power and the identity-neutral reach of the First
Amendment. In the context of freedom of speech and independent
expenditures, denying First Amendment protection because of the
speaker’s inadequate stake grants the government enormous power to
restrict speech and conflicts with numerous First Amendment principles.
This Note proposes that the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom
of speech should override the plenary power as applied to aliens located
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Specifically, when
confronting issues involving aliens’ First Amendment rights, courts should
focus on the alien’s location, not stake. Moreover, this Note argues that the
government should not be able to deport an alien solely for engaging in
constitutionally protected speech.
Part I of this Note examines the origins of the federal government’s
plenary power over immigration, and subsequent attempts to constrain it
based on an alien’s location (the location theory) or on her stake (the stake
theory). It explains the Court’s shift in the twentieth century away from the
location theory toward the stake theory, and the impact on the Court’s
plenary power jurisprudence of statutory changes regarding the removal of
aliens unlawfully present. Part II discusses the Court’s cases on
independent expenditures, focusing on its disavowal of the idea that the
speaker’s identity should determine First Amendment protection, and its
emphasis on the marketplace of ideas. Finally, Part III demonstrates how
both doctrines collided in Bluman and why using stake to determine aliens’
First Amendment protection is problematic.
I.

THE PLENARY POWER OVER IMMIGRATION, AND THE STAKE
AND LOCATION THEORIES

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Supreme
Court primarily employed the location theory, determining the extent of
constitutional protection based on whether an alien was inside or outside of
the United States. During the mid-twentieth century, however, the Court
transitioned to utilizing the stake theory, according greater constitutional
rights to aliens—usually LPRs—with a stake in the country. Finally, in
1996, statutory changes to removal procedures provided prudential reasons
to use the stake theory.
A. Early Developments
The federal government’s power to regulate immigration—the plenary
power—stems from two sources: (1) the notion that as a sovereign country
the United States has an inherent right to determine which individuals can
213
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and cannot enter20 and (2) the Constitution’s grant of authority “[t]o
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.”21 The plenary power was first
introduced in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, which held that the federal
government could exclude aliens whenever “the interests of the country
require it,” and furthermore, that the judiciary would not intervene.22 To be
clear, exclusion means that aliens are prevented from entering the country.
Four years later, Fong Yue Ting v. United States extended the plenary
power to encompass not only exclusion, but also deportation.23 The Court
upheld deportation because “[t]he right of a nation to expel or deport
foreigners, who have not been naturalized or taken any steps towards
becoming citizens of the country” is “absolute and unqualified.”24
Additionally, the Court held that deportation is not punishment because it is
not a criminal sentence but rather a corollary of the sovereign nation’s
inherent powers to expel aliens.25
Fong Yue Ting produced three powerful dissents that planted the seeds
of the stake theory and the location theory. Although the dissents followed
different paths, they were all attempts to place limits on the plenary power,
which the dissenters believed was enabling a “despotic” government.26
Chief Justice Fuller formulated the basis of the stake theory by arguing that
the government’s power to deport was different from its power to exclude
because “limitations exist or are imposed upon the deprivation of that
which has been lawfully acquired.”27 Specifically, an alien already lawfully
present had a much greater stake than one initially seeking to enter, and
therefore the government should not be able to deport him
20

Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 603–04 (1889).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
22
130 U.S. at 609. Chae Chan Ping upheld the Chinese Exclusion Act, which heavily restricted
Chinese immigration. See id. at 597–600.
23
149 U.S. 698 (1893).
24
Id. at 707. The majority did not address the fact that the petitioners, Chinese immigrants, were
ineligible for citizenship at the time and thus could not have taken any of these steps. See id. at 716.
25
Id. at 709. This distinction has been challenged in numerous subsequent dissents, but the Court
has not overruled it. See generally Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment: A Historical Analysis
of the British Practice of Banishment and Its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 115 (1999) (tracing various dissenting opinions and dicta challenging the assertion that deportation
is not punishment).
26
See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 755–56 (Field, J., dissenting) (“The existence of the power [to
deport aliens unconditionally] is only consistent with the admission that the government is one of
unlimited and despotic power so far as aliens domiciled in the country are concerned.”); id. at 737
(Brewer, J., dissenting) (warning that the majority was effectively permitting the government “to
declare the limits” on its own power); id. at 763 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (contending the majority
granted “an unlimited and arbitrary power” that was “incompatible with the immutable principles of
justice, inconsistent with the nature of our government, and in conflict with the written Constitution by
which that government was created and those principles secured”).
27
Id. at 762 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
21
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unconditionally.28 Justice Field’s dissent highlighted the alien’s stake by
noting that an alien being deported has already “formed the most tender
connections” with the United States, unlike an alien merely being
excluded.29 Justice Field also focused on legality, stressing that the alien in
question was here with the country’s consent.30 Thus, the crucial distinction
in determining constitutional protection was the alien’s stake in the
country.
By contrast, Justice Brewer’s dissent distinguished the power of
exclusion from deportation based on the alien’s location. Notably, he
emphasized that protection extended to aliens lawfully present:
The Constitution has no extraterritorial effect, and those who have not come
lawfully within our territory cannot claim any protection from its
provisions. . . . But the Constitution has potency everywhere within the limits
of our territory, and the powers which the national government may exercise
within such limits are those, and only those, given to it by that instrument.31

Put simply, the location theory contends that the Constitution does not
apply to aliens who have been excluded because they are not in the
country, but once aliens are present lawfully they are entitled to
constitutional protection. Curiously, he conceded that aliens “who have
become domiciled in a country are entitled to a more distinct and larger
measure of protection than those who are simply passing through, or
temporarily in it.”32 Thus, while primarily based on an alien’s location, the
theory still recognizes a role for stake in that an alien unlawfully present—
and consequently unable to claim a legal stake—is not necessarily entitled
to the same level of protection as an alien lawfully present in the country.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the location
theory dominated the Court’s jurisprudence. The Court stressed the textual
basis for granting constitutional protection based on location: the
“provisions [of the Fourteenth Amendment] are universal in their
application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction.”33 Similarly,
Wong Wing v. United States held that an alien could not be subjected to
hard labor without trial for the sole crime of being in the country
unlawfully because the Fifth and Sixth Amendments say “person” not
“citizen,” meaning “all persons within the territory of the United States”

28
29
30
31
32
33

See id.
Id. at 749 (Field, J., dissenting).
Id. at 754.
Id. at 738 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 734.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
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are protected by those Amendments.34 Notably, Wong Wing spoke less of
the rights guaranteed to the alien and more of the danger in permitting the
government to disregard the restrictions that the Constitution imposes.35
In the Japanese Immigrant Case, the Court had to confront the
importance of legality to the location theory when determining whether an
alien who had allegedly entered the country illegally and remained for four
days before being apprehended was entitled to due process before being
deported.36 The power to exclude and expel aliens was reaffirmed, but the
Court qualified that the government still could not “disregard the
fundamental principles that inhere in ‘due process of law’ as understood at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution.”37 Just like Wong Wing, the
Japanese Immigrant Case emphasized the importance of restricting the
government from acting with “arbitrary power.”38
Focusing on an alien’s location, however, led to harsh results when
long-term immigrants left the country and attempted to reenter because
aliens outside the jurisdiction were afforded little constitutional protection,
a principle known as the reentry doctrine.39 Building on the reentry
doctrine, Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei rebuffed the relevance
of an LPR’s twenty-five-year residence, instead employing the legal fiction
that Ellis Island was not within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States to deny due process to an LPR who sought to reenter the country
after nineteen months abroad.40 Because Mezei was outside of the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, he was not entitled to due process.

34

163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896). Justice Field, who had previously focused on stake, wrote separately
to chastise the Government for its “contention that persons within the territorial jurisdiction of this
republic might be beyond the protection of the law . . . in face of the great constitutional amendment
which declares that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” Id. at 242–43 (Field, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
35
See id. at 237 (majority opinion) (“It is not consistent with the theory of our government that the
legislature should, after having defined an offence as an infamous crime, find the fact of guilt and
adjudge the punishment by one of its own agents.”).
36
Yamataya v. Fisher (Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 87, 98 (1903).
37
Id. at 100.
38
Id. at 101.
39
See United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422, 423–26 (1933) (holding that an LPR who
was reentering the country after a brief visit abroad could be excluded, despite his twenty-four-year
LPR status because as long as an alien was at the port of entry, the government could exclude him); see
also Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547–48 (1895).
40
345 U.S. 206, 208, 213–15 (1953). For an alien seeking to enter, “[w]hatever the procedure
authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.” Id. at 212
(quoting United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)).
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B. Mid-Twentieth Century to 1996
As a result of the often cruel effects of denying constitutional rights to
long-term residents attempting to reenter, the Court began focusing on an
alien’s stake in the United States when determining constitutional
protection. Just ten years after Mezei, the Court redefined reentry in
Rosenberg v. Fleuti, holding that an LPR who left the country for an
“innocent, casual, and brief” trip was entitled to the same constitutional
rights upon reentry that he would receive if he were present in the United
States.41 The Court was simply unwilling to overlook the alien’s stake,
highlighting the reentry doctrine’s grievous effects for LPRs.42 Importantly,
the Court decided Fleuti on statutory grounds, reasoning that the definition
of “entry” in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 was intended “to
ameliorate the severe effects of the strict entry doctrine.”43
By 1982, Landon v. Plasencia fully embraced the stake theory to
determine the due process rights of an LPR reentering the country.44
Plasencia was returning from a short trip to Mexico when she was detained
at the border for attempting to smuggle six unauthorized aliens into the
country.45 Following an exclusion hearing before an immigration judge, she
was ordered “excluded and deported.”46 Rather than relying on statutory
interpretation as in Fleuti, the Court held that Plasencia was
constitutionally entitled to due process because her trip to Mexico was brief
and, as an LPR, her stake was “weighty.”47

41

374 U.S. 449, 460–62 (1963).
See id. at 460 (“What we face here is another harsh consequence of the strict ‘entry’
doctrine . . . . Certainly when an alien like Fleuti who has entered the country lawfully and has acquired
a residence here steps across a border and, in effect, steps right back, subjecting him to exclusion for a
condition for which he could not have been deported had he remained in the country seems to be
placing him at the mercy of the ‘sport of chance’ and the ‘meaningless and irrational hazards’ . . . .”
(quoting Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878, 879 (2d Cir. 1947))); see also Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory
Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 577 (1990) (“In large part, the majority’s Fleuti opinion . . . evinces
sympathy for the view that immigration law inadequately recognized a permanent resident’s stake in
remaining in the United States.”).
43
374 U.S. at 461–62 (internal quotation marks omitted).
44
459 U.S. 21 (1982); see John L. Pollock, Note, Missing “Persons”: Expedited Removal, Fong
Yue Ting, and the Fifth Amendment, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1109, 1115 (1999) (“The Court in Plasencia
endorsed the idea that constitutional status in the immigration context should depend on more than just
geographic location.”). Under the location theory, she would be an alien entering the country, and thus
entitled to almost no due process; under the stake theory, she would be entitled to much greater due
process based on her status as an LPR. See Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32–35.
45
Placensia, 459 U.S. at 23.
46
Id. at 24–25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
47
Id. at 34 (noting she could “lose the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom,” and
“the right to rejoin her immediate family” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
42
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Redefining the reentry doctrine is emblematic of the Court’s shift
toward the stake theory throughout the last half of the twentieth century.48
In 1950, the Court began describing aliens’ constitutional rights in terms of
a sliding scale—the deeper the alien’s ties to the country, the more rights
he is afforded:
The alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally hospitable, has
been accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his
identity with our society. Mere lawful presence in the country creates an
implied assurance of safe conduct and gives him certain rights; they become
more extensive and secure when he makes preliminary declaration of intention
to become a citizen, and they expand to those of full citizenship upon
naturalization.49

Consequently, LPRs present for many years and with strong ties to the
United States are afforded the most constitutional rights—the core of the
stake theory.
The sliding scale underlies the Court’s holdings that Congress can
treat classes of aliens differently. For example, Mathews v. Diaz upheld a
statute providing welfare benefits to LPRs but not other aliens.50 Despite
acknowledging that the Due Process Clause protects every person within
the country’s jurisdiction,51 the Court reasoned that Congress could treat
LPRs differently from other aliens because only LPRs had a sufficient
stake.52 Continuing this theme, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez held that
the Fourth Amendment “refers to a class of persons who are part of a
national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient
connection with this country to be considered part of that community.”53
The respondent, a Mexican resident and citizen, was imprisoned in the
48

See Motomura, supra note 42, at 575 (“In the past twenty-five years, one key aspect of the
movement away from classical immigration law has been an increasing acceptance of the view that an
alien’s constitutional status when challenging immigration statutes should depend on more than just her
geographic location. A returning permanent resident, even if outside the United States, typically has ties
or a ‘stake’ here that merit more exacting constitutional scrutiny than that available to first-time
entrants.”); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST.
COMMENT. 9, 9–10 (1990).
49
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950).
50
426 U.S. 67 (1976).
51
Id. at 77.
52
See id. at 80 (“The decision to share that bounty with our guests may take into account the
character of the relationship between the alien and this country: Congress may decide that as the alien’s
tie grows stronger, so does the strength of his claim to an equal share of that munificence.”).
53
494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990). The majority opinion distinguished the Fourth Amendment based on
its text and history, but noted in dicta that the analysis “suggests” the same is true for “the people” in
the First Amendment. Id. at 265–67. But see Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S.
471, 497 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“It is well settled that ‘[f]reedom of speech and of press is
accorded aliens residing in this country.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S.
135, 148 (1945))).
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United States when U.S. officials searched the respondent’s house in
Mexico.54 The opinion disregarded that the alien in question was located in
the United States, instead emphasizing that because he was imprisoned here
involuntarily he had no stake.55
C. From 1996 to Today
The rising number of undocumented aliens presented significant
problems for both the stake and location theories.56 Prior to 1996,
undocumented aliens were removed after a deportation hearing, which
provided greater due process than an exclusion hearing.57 Focusing on
territoriality meant that aliens who successfully evaded authorities were
granted more rights than those who lawfully attempted to enter but were
stopped at the border. Opponents of the location theory protested that this
effectively rewarded aliens for breaking the law.58 Meanwhile, the stake
theory also contained an awkward tension: even though undocumented
aliens had no lawful stake in the country, they often had developed
substantial ties and connections to society after living here many years.59
In September 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),60 which effectively
overruled the entry doctrine. First, it changed the reentry rule for LPRs so
that an LPR returning from abroad would no longer “be regarded as
seeking an admission into the United States” unless one of six exceptions
applied.61 This change ensured that LPRs would receive substantially more
due process, reflecting the recent emphasis on stake. Second, and more
54

See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 262, 271–72.
See id. at 273–75 (“[R]espondent had no voluntary connection with this country that might place
him among ‘the people’ of the United States.”). The Court was careful to point out that its reasoning did
not necessarily apply to aliens residing in the United States voluntarily and unlawfully. See id. at 272–
73.
56
See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 44 (1984)
(“The challenge that this development poses to the continued coherence and integrity of classical
immigration law can scarcely be exaggerated. Just as the hard facts of hopelessly porous borders
demand a new understanding of sovereignty, the reality of undocumented aliens’ humanity and their
steady integration into communal life here undermines some of the traditional conceptions that that law
reflected. New ‘social contracts’ between these aliens and American society are being negotiated each
day, and these cannot easily be nullified with invocations of sovereignty, as classically understood.”).
57
David M. Grable, Note, Personhood Under the Due Process Clause: A Constitutional Analysis
of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 820,
821, 823 (1998).
58
See David A. Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal in the New Immigration Laws, 40 VA.
J. INT’L L. 673, 689–90 (2000).
59
See Schuck, supra note 56, at 43–44.
60
Pub L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1–1778 (2012)).
61
See § 1101(a)(13)(C).
55
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importantly, IIRIRA changed the previous categories of excludable aliens
(those at the border) and deportable aliens (those present in the country) to
two new categories: deportable aliens and inadmissible aliens.62 The
distinction hinges on whether an alien has been inspected and admitted
(i.e., has entered legally).63 If an alien has been inspected and admitted, he
is deportable; if he has not, he is effectively considered at the border—
regardless of his actual location—and is inadmissible.
Third, IIRIRA created a new procedure called expedited removal,
which grants immigration officers the authority to remove an alien from the
United States if they “determine[] that an alien . . . is inadmissible.”64
Expedited removal, rather than deportation, applies to all arriving aliens
and to aliens apprehended within the country who have not “affirmatively
shown” that they have been physically present in the country for at least
two years.65 The decision that an alien is subject to expedited removal
“shall be in the sole and unreviewable discretion of the Attorney
General.”66 Consequently, an alien who has illegally entered the United
States within the past two years can be removed without due process.
The shift from entrance to admission plays an important role in the
Court’s plenary power jurisprudence.67 Under the location theory, an alien
present in the United States would be entitled to due process regardless of
whether he was present lawfully or unlawfully.68 To be clear, unlawful
aliens could still be deported—they just would have to receive due process
before being deported. However, IIRIRA created a legal fiction in which
aliens present in the United States but who entered illegally are effectively
considered as if they are at the border.69
62

See id. § 1229a(e)(2); Pollock, supra note 44, at 1110–11. For the list of inadmissible aliens, see
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). For the list of reasons or actions making aliens deportable, see § 1227(a) (grounds
of deportability for LPRs), and § 1227(b) (deportation of certain nonimmigrants).
63
“Admission” is defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection
and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).
64
Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Aliens claiming asylum are not subject to expedited removal. Id.
65
Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II). In 2004, the Department of Homeland Security announced that it
would subject all inadmissible aliens encountered within 100 miles of a border to expedited removal,
unless they could “establish[] to the satisfaction of an immigration officer that they have been
physically present in the U.S. continuously” for fourteen days. Designating Aliens for Expedited
Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877 (Aug. 11, 2004).
66
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(I).
67
Expedited removal has been criticized by many commentators. See, e.g., Grable, supra note 57;
Pollock, supra note 44. For an analysis of IIRIRA under both the stake and location theories, see
Grable, supra note 57, at 833–53.
68
See Grable, supra note 57, at 835–36. While Justice Brewer’s dissent in Fong Yue Ting left open
the question of legality, see supra note 31 and accompanying text, the Japanese Immigrant Case
conclusively held that aliens unlawfully present were still entitled to due process before deportation, see
supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
69
See Grable, supra note 57, at 836.
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By emphasizing admission instead of entry, IIRIRA provides
prudential reasons for using the stake theory to not grant the full panoply of
rights to aliens here unlawfully. Specifically, IIRIRA affords due process
depending on the length of an alien’s residence and the legality of his
entry.70 In turn, “[t]hese criteria reflect a moral judgment that the United
States should not reward illegally entering aliens with a hearing, unless
they have lived here long enough to develop the close ties associated with
long-term residence.”71
As a result, when employing the stake theory some commentators
have focused on the fact that because an alien is present unlawfully they
cannot be entitled to any stake.72 Others have argued that the stake theory
should assess the constitutional protection afforded an unlawful alien by
focusing on the strength of their ties to the national community regardless
of the illegality of their entry.73 This discrepancy highlights an initial
problem with the stake theory, namely that it is inherently a subjective
analysis. Moreover, it is puzzling to grant constitutional protection based
on one’s stake or certain criteria that evince a connection to the national
community, but then ignore those indicia solely because the alien entered
illegally.
Two important cases arose in the early 2000s about the due process
rights of noncitizens that demonstrate the current tension between the two
theories. In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court considered the constitutionality of
a statute permitting an alien ordered removed to be detained indefinitely if
the government could not secure his removal.74 The majority opinion
stressed that the detained alien was located within the territorial jurisdiction
of the country, describing it as “well established” that such aliens were
entitled to greater constitutional protection.75 Therefore, because the alien
70

See Dulce Foster, Note, Judge, Jury and Executioner: INS Summary-Exclusion Power Under the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 82 MINN. L. REV. 209, 226
(1997).
71
Id. at 237.
72
See David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: Political
Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 165, 230–34 (1983).
73
See Martin, supra note 58, at 690 (“[Entrants without inspection (EWIs)] as a class are more
likely to have established ties to the community during their time in the country. Because those ties
were illicitly obtained and must have been known by their holders to carry a deep vulnerability, perhaps
they should be discounted somewhat in the due process calculus. But they are not weightless, and it
would be unfortunate if the Court were to act as though EWIs have no greater interests than first-time
applicants for admission at the border.”); Grable, supra note 57, at 838–45.
74
533 U.S. 678 (2001). Usually, this occurred when the alien’s home country refused to accept
them back. Ultimately, the Court read into the statute “an implicit ‘reasonable time’ limitation,” such
that aliens could be detained only for a reasonable time, not indefinitely. Id. at 682.
75
Id. at 693. Despite IIRIRA’s emphasis on admission, not entry, the majority opinion contended
that “[t]he distinction between an alien who has effected an entry into the United States and one who
has never entered runs throughout immigration law.” Id. The key is that “once an alien enters the
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was located in the country he was entitled to due process regardless of his
stake. Justice Scalia dissented, claiming that the case “is at bottom a
claimed right of release into this country by an individual who concededly
has no legal right to be here.”76 To Justice Scalia, the focus was not on the
alien’s location, but rather on his lack of a lawful stake because he was
already ordered deported.77
Two years later, the Court upheld a statute subjecting all aliens
convicted of a crime to mandatory detention without individualized bond
hearings, pending their deportation proceedings.78 Justice Souter dissented,
chastising the majority for ignoring that the respondent was an LPR.79 He
claimed LPRs were entitled to greater constitutional protection than
nonimmigrants because “their lives are generally indistinguishable from
those of United States citizens.”80 Ultimately, he contended that LPRs are
entitled to greater constitutional protection than nonimmigrants and
therefore the government had to provide LPRs an individualized hearing.81
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the currently accepted view
is that as an alien’s stake grows larger, she is entitled to more constitutional
protection. However, what is unclear is why: perhaps an alien becomes
more deserving of protection as she develops stronger ties.82 Alternatively,
as an alien develops ties the Court may simply become increasingly
alarmed at permitting Congress to employ methods that would be
unconstitutional if applied to citizens.83 Relying on stake rather than

country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the
United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or
permanent.” Id.
76
Id. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77
Id. (“Insofar as a claimed legal right to release into this country is concerned, an alien under final
order of removal stands on an equal footing with an inadmissible alien at the threshold of entry: He has
no such right.”).
78
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 527–31 (2003).
79
Id. at 540–41 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80
Id. at 544. He did attempt to marry the two theories by pointing out that “all aliens within our
territory are ‘persons’ entitled to the protection of the Due Process Clause,” but LPRs have a
“particularly strong” claim to “[t]he constitutional protection of . . . person and property.” Id. at 543–44.
81
Id. at 547.
82
Compare Martin, supra note 72 (proposing that constitutional rights should be based on
“membership in the national community”), with T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process, and
“Community Ties”: A Response to Martin, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 242–44 (1983) (rebuffing
membership as a criteria for determining which aliens deserve which rights as “inadequate” and
dismissing a theory of reliance to explain membership).
83
Cf. Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 19 (“Ultimately, it appears that the two lines of cases are not
part of a coherent whole, but rather reflect conflicting strands in our constitutionalism: one concerned
with affirming the importance of membership in a national community; the other pursuing a notion of
fundamental human rights that protects individuals regardless of their status.”).
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location to determine First Amendment protection, however, accords the
government far-reaching power to limit freedom of speech.
II. INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on independent expenditures has
emphasized two interrelated ideas. First, the Court has stressed the
irrelevance of the speaker’s identity to determine First Amendment
protection, maintaining that censorship of disfavored speakers contravenes
the First Amendment. Second, the Court has repeatedly evoked the value of
the marketplace of ideas. These principles intersect because governmental
censorship, whether based on the speech’s content or the speaker’s identity,
interferes with the marketplace by preventing the free flow of ideas.
A. Independent Expenditures as Speech
The landmark case Buckley v. Valeo evaluated the campaign finance
restrictions in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in
1974.84 As a preliminary matter, the Court underscored that the expenditure
limits impinged upon an individual’s freedom of association and
expression.85 Crucially, the Court declared that independent expenditures
are political speech, regardless of the fact that money had to be spent.86 For
that reason, expenditures were just as “entitled to protection under the First
Amendment . . . [as] the discussion of political policy generally,”87
specifically strict scrutiny.
The Court rebuffed all of the government’s proffered interests to limit
political speech. First, the Court rejected any “interest in preventing
corruption and the appearance of corruption”88 on the grounds that the
limits only prevented some types of expenditures and that independent
expenditures were not coordinated with the candidate.89 Second, the Court
dismissed the interest “in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and
groups to influence the outcome of elections.”90 In particular, the Court
reasoned that such an antidistortion justification was improper because the
First Amendment was “designed ‘to secure the widest possible
84

424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
Id. at 19, 22.
86
See id. at 15–19 (“[T]his Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on
the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting
scrutiny required by the First Amendment.”).
87
Id. at 48.
88
Id. at 45.
89
Id. at 45–48. The interest in preventing corruption was sufficient to justify limits on
contributions, but without coordination with the candidate, the Court reasoned independent
expenditures simply could not have the same corruptive influence as contributions. Id.
90
Id. at 48–49.
85
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dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources,’ and
‘to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes desired by the people.’”91 As a corollary, the Court
contended that First Amendment protection could not turn on certain
characteristics of the speaker, such as wealth.92 Ultimately, the limits on
independent expenditures were invalidated because the Government had no
compelling interest and the limits too heavily burdened political speech.93
Almost fifteen years later, the Court considered the constitutionality of
a state ban on corporate independent expenditures in Austin v. Michigan
State Chamber of Commerce.94 Austin reaffirmed that “the use of funds to
support a political candidate is ‘speech’” and that independent expenditures
“constitute ‘political expression at the core of our electoral process and of
the First Amendment freedoms.’”95 Furthermore, it explained that
corporations were entitled to First Amendment protection.96 The limits
were upheld, though based on an antidistortion rationale despite Buckley’s
rejection of an antidistortion interest for individuals; the Court reasoned
that corporations would distort the political process as a result of their
“state-conferred,” overwhelming financial resources.97
In 2010, Citizens United overruled Austin, concluding that “[n]o
sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech
of . . . corporations.”98 The Court began by holding as a matter of law that
“independent expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption or the
appearance of corruption.”99 Next, it overruled Austin’s antidistortion
rationale because “the Government may not suppress political speech on
the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.”100 As further justification, the
Court reasoned that restricting certain speakers “interferes with the ‘open
marketplace’ of ideas protected by the First Amendment.”101 The Court
91

Id. at 49 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 269 (1964)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
92
Id.
93
Id. at 48–51.
94
494 U.S. 652 (1990).
95
Id. at 657 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39) (internal quotation marks omitted).
96
Id. (“The mere fact that the Chamber is a corporation does not remove its speech from the ambit
of the First Amendment.” (citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978))).
97
Id. at 658–60.
98
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
99
Id. at 357.
100
Id. at 365. Several commentators have argued that the ban on foreign nationals is based on an
antidistortion rationale, and should be invalid based on Citizens United’s reasoning. See Richard L.
Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 608 (2011); Toni M.
Massaro, Foreign Nationals, Electoral Spending, and the First Amendment, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 663, 687 (2011).
101
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 354.
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warned that banning corporate independent expenditures—which it equated
to “censorship”—would cause “the electorate [to be] deprived of
information, knowledge and opinion vital to its function.”102 Thus, the
majority grounded its opinion on two principles: that the speaker’s identity
should not determine whether the government can censor the speaker’s
speech, and that such censorship impermissibly interferes with the
marketplace of ideas.
B. Bans Based on the Speaker’s Identity
Citizens United instructed that the First Amendment prohibits
Congress from criminalizing political speech on the basis of a speaker’s
identity; put simply, political speech is political speech no matter who is
speaking it.103 Because the First Amendment is “[p]remised on mistrust of
governmental power,” the Court rebuffed the idea that the Government
could be given an “instrument[] to censor” speech on the basis of the
speaker’s identity; such censorship would be antithetical to the First
Amendment precisely because “[s]peech restrictions based on the identity
of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.”104
Consequently, “[t]he First Amendment protects speech and speaker, and
the ideas that flow from each.”105
C. The Marketplace of Ideas
Censoring speech, whether because of content or identity, interferes
with the marketplace of ideas.106 Justice Holmes introduced the marketplace
of ideas concept in his dissent in Abrams v. United States, a case involving
five alien defendants.107 He argued that disfavored ideas should not be
102

Id. (quoting United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 144 (1948) (Rutledge, J.,
concurring in result)).
103
See id. at 350 (“[T]he First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political speech
based on the speaker’s identity.”); id. at 341 (rejecting “the proposition that, in the context of political
speech, the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers”); id. at 340 (“[T]he
First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints. Prohibited, too, are
restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others.” (citation
omitted)); id. at 393 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[The] nature [of political speech] does not change simply
because it was funded by a corporation. Nor does the character of that funding produce any reduction
whatever in the ‘inherent worth of the speech’ and ‘its capacity for informing the public.’” (quoting
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978))).
104
Id. at 340 (majority opinion).
105
Id. at 341; accord id. at 376 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“The text and purpose of the First
Amendment point in the same direction: Congress may not prohibit political speech, even if the speaker
is a corporation or union.”); id. at 392–93 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The Amendment is written in terms
of ‘speech,’ not speakers. Its text offers no foothold for excluding any category of speaker . . . .”).
106
Id. at 348–56 (majority opinion).
107
250 U.S. 616, 617 (1919). As another commentator points out, “Strangely, the Supreme Court’s
analysis does not address the relevance, if any, of this fact.” Robert Plotkin, First Amendment
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prohibited, but instead included in the “free trade in ideas” because “the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market.”108
The Court has embraced the marketplace of ideas in its campaign
finance jurisprudence. Political debate must be open so that citizens can be
fully informed of all views:
[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for
judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments. They may
consider, in making their judgment, the source and credibility of the advocate.
But if there be any danger that the people cannot evaluate the information and
arguments advanced by appellants, it is a danger contemplated by the Framers
of the First Amendment.109

Censorship through expenditure limitations is unnecessary because in the
market the best ideas will rise to the top, and the worst will fall into
oblivion.
Citizens United wholeheartedly endorsed the marketplace of ideas,
taking a strong pro-information stance.110 The Court contended that
expenditure limitations are particularly suspect because they directly
regulate political speech, “necessarily reduc[ing] the quantity of expression
by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration,
and the size of the audience reached.”111 In our representative democracy, it
is essential that the citizenry can receive information regarding elected
officials from a variety of sources.112
Moreover, empowering the government to censor and control the
speech that voters are allowed to hear is incompatible with the First
Amendment.113 Instead of governmental censorship, the marketplace is best
equipped to deal with disfavored speakers’ ideas.114 Prohibiting speech not
Challenges to the Membership and Advocacy Provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 623, 628 n.40 (1996).
108
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
109
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791–92 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
110
Massaro, supra note 100, at 684.
111
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per
curiam)).
112
Id. at 341.
113
See id. at 356; Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 772 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
114
See, e.g., Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2288 (2012) (“The
First Amendment creates ‘an open marketplace’ in which differing ideas about political, economic, and
social issues can compete freely for public acceptance without improper government interference.”
(quoting N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008))); Ariz. Free Enter.
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826 (2011) (“The First Amendment embodies
our choice as a Nation that, when it comes to such speech, the guiding principle is freedom—the
‘unfettered interchange of ideas’—not whatever the State may view as fair.” (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 14)); N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 552 U.S. at 208 (“The First Amendment creates an open
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only infringes upon an individual’s right to political speech but also upon
citizens’ rights to hear such speech.115 Citizens’ First Amendment rights are
abridged because “[t]he First Amendment involves not only the right to
speak and publish but also the right to hear, to learn, to know.”116 Thus,
censorship of certain foreign speakers affects the First Amendment rights
of citizens as well.
III. RECONCILIATION
The stake-based approach to aliens’ constitutional rights and the First
Amendment right to independent expenditures regardless of the speaker’s
identity are incompatible: an alien’s stake is a product of his identity, but
according to First Amendment principles the identity—or stake—of a
speaker cannot determine whether Congress can deny his freedom of
speech. Moreover, by granting Congress the power to censor certain aliens
present in the United States,117 the marketplace of ideas is arbitrarily capped
and citizens’ First Amendment rights risk infringement.

marketplace where ideas, most especially political ideas, may compete without governmental
interference.”); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 274 (2003) (opinion of Thomas, J.).
115
See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50–51 (1988) (“At the heart of the First
Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on
matters of public interest and concern. The freedom to speak one’s mind is not only an aspect of
individual liberty—and thus a good unto itself—but also is essential to the common quest for truth and
the vitality of society as a whole.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (“The Constitution often protects interests broader than those of the
party seeking their vindication. The First Amendment, in particular, serves significant societal interests.
The proper question therefore is not whether corporations ‘have’ First Amendment rights and, if so,
whether they are coextensive with those of natural persons. Instead, the question must be whether [the
statute] abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect.”).
116
Mandel, 408 U.S. at 771 (Douglas, J., dissenting); accord id. at 775 (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“It is now well established that the Constitution protects
the right to receive information and ideas. ‘This freedom . . . necessarily protects the right to
receive . . . .’ This right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, is
fundamental to our free society.” (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943))).
117
This Note focuses solely on the limits for individuals, or natural persons. The ban on foreign
corporations presents intriguing questions but falls outside the scope of this Note. In particular, one
would need to analyze the extent to which the plenary power permits the government to regulate
corporations, and the extent to which a corporation’s presence in the United States is sufficient. For
example, if a foreign corporation has a subsidiary in the United States, can it make independent
expenditures, or is only the subsidiary permitted to make them? Many commentators have already
analyzed the issue of foreign corporations’ rights to make independent expenditures post-Citizens
United, reaching different conclusions. Compare Scott L. Friedman, Note, First Amendment and
“Foreign-Controlled” U.S. Corporations: Why Congress Ought to Affirm Domestic Subsidiaries’
Corporate Political-Speech Rights, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 613 (2013) (arguing that following
confusion stemming from Citizens United’s treatment of foreign corporations, Congress should accord
domestic subsidiaries campaign finance rights), with Matt A. Vega, The First Amendment Lost in
Translation: Preventing Foreign Influence in U.S. Elections After Citizens United v. FEC, 44 LOY. L.A.
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These conflicting ideals collided in Bluman v. FEC, which upheld
§ 441e, the ban prohibiting lawful nonimmigrants from making
independent expenditures.118 The remainder of this Note explains § 441e in
more detail and then demonstrate how Bluman effectively permitted the
stake theory to override First Amendment principles. This Note concludes
by proposing that the implied plenary power should not supersede the First
Amendment freedom of speech guarantee. Consequently, when confronting
an alien’s First Amendment rights, the alien’s location, and not stake,
should be determinative because this approach is more faithful to the
Amendment’s text and underlying ideals.
A. Section 441e, Bluman, and the Importance of Stake
Section 441e119 can trace its roots back to the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938, which required “agent[s] of a foreign principal”
to register and disclose their identities if they were “engaging in
propaganda activities.”120 Campaign contributions by “an agent of a foreign
principal” were first banned in 1966.121 In 1974, Congress broadened the
prohibition to cover all foreign nationals.122
Allegations of improper campaign contributions in the 1996
presidential election prompted Congress to conduct an investigation. The
resulting Senate Report revealed that foreign officials had impermissibly
donated money through straw men (i.e., U.S. citizens or LPRs).123 The
Senate Report recommended strengthening the ban because foreign
contributions could lead to “an implicit quid pro quo arrangement.”124
L. REV. 951 (2011) (contending that foreign corporations’ campaign contributions and expenditures are
not covered under the First Amendment and should be banned by Congress).
118
800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012).
119
2 U.S.C. § 441e (2012).
120
Pub L. No. 77-532, 56 Stat. 248, 248–49 (1942) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 611–616
(2012)). An “agent of a foreign principal” was defined as “any person who acts or agrees to act, within
the United States, as, or who is or holds himself out to be . . . a public-relations counsel, publicity agent,
information-service employee, servant, agent, representative, or attorney for a foreign principal.” Id. at
249.
121
Pub L. No. 89-486, 80 Stat. 244, 248 (1966) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 611–621).
Agents were prohibited from contributing either directly or through straw men. Id.
122
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(codified as amended in relevant part at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–455 (2012)).
123
1 Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 Federal Election
Campaigns, S. REP. NO. 105-167, at 20–21 (1998).
124
Id. at 22; see also id. at 33 (“[T]he danger [of foreign contributions is] that powerful foreign
nationals, or even governments, would attempt to buy influence through campaign contributions.”).
However, the Court has held not only that preventing corruption is not a sufficient governmental
interest to prohibit campaign expenditures (as opposed to contributions), but also that, as a matter of
law, independent expenditures do not give rise to corruption. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying
text. It is worth emphasizing that Citizens United did not hold that corporate independent expenditures
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Congress did so when it enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act125 a
few years later: § 441e now prohibits all noncitizens, except LPRs, from
contributing to any federal, state, or local election, and from making any
expenditure in support of or in opposition to any candidate.126
Section 441e was upheld in Bluman v. FEC.127 Judge Kavanaugh,
writing for the three-judge district court panel, claimed the “First
Amendment issues raised” in Citizens United and Buckley were not
“implicate[d]” by § 441e;128 instead, § 441e centered on the “preliminary
and foundational question about the definition of the American political
community.”129 Because contributions and express advocacy expenditures
“are part of the overall process of democratic self-government,”130 Congress
could ban aliens from making them.131 Put simply, the court determined the
extent of the speaker’s First Amendment protection based on whether the
speaker is part of the community. Consequently, the speaker’s identity, a
result of his insufficient stake, justifies a ban on political speech—the
antithesis of the reasoning in Citizens United.
Curiously, Citizens United mentioned § 441e briefly to state that the
Court “need not reach the question whether the Government has a
compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations from
influencing our Nation’s political process.”132 Directly tying it to the ban on
corporate expenditures suggests that § 441e does in fact raise those First
Amendment issues. Moreover, whereas bans on independent expenditures
are analyzed under strict scrutiny, federal laws regulating immigration are
analyzed under rational basis because of the plenary power.133 However,
do not lead to corruption, but rather that no independent expenditures do. Thus, to hold that foreign
independent expenditures are somehow corruptive would require overturning Citizens United.
125
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified at 2
U.S.C. §§ 431–455).
126
2 U.S.C. § 441e(a). One of the reasons LPRs were specifically excluded from the prohibition
was that “[l]egal permanent residents have a stake in the future of America, and should be allowed to
voice their support for candidates and be assured a part in the political process.” 144 Cong. Rec. 5158
(Mar. 30, 1998) (statement of Rep. Mink).
127
800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012).
128
Id. at 286 (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976) (per curiam)).
129
Id.
130
Id. at 288. The court’s reference to the overall process of democratic self-government stems
from the Supreme Court’s line of equal protection cases carving out an exception to its strict scrutiny
analysis of state laws distinguishing between citizens and aliens for classifications that “deal with
matters resting firmly within a State’s constitutional prerogatives.” See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634, 648 (1973). Thus, “a State may deny aliens the right to vote, or to run for elective office, for these
lie at the heart of our political institutions.” Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978).
131
Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 288.
132
558 U.S. at 362.
133
See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 86–87 (1976).
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Citizens United hinted that § 441e should be analyzed under strict scrutiny
by referring to a “compelling interest,” further suggesting that § 441e raises
the same First Amendment issues.134
Bluman also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that “the right to speak
about elections is different from the right to participate in elections”
because this expressive act, namely making contributions or expenditures,
“is both speech and participation in democratic self-government.”135 But,
the opinion conflated speaking about elections (i.e., independent
expenditures) with participating in elections (i.e., voting or running for
office). It did not adequately explain why it deviated from prior holdings
that independent expenditures are the equivalent of political speech and
fully protected by the First Amendment regardless of their potential
participation element.136 To be sure, the Constitution expressly prohibits
aliens from serving in many federal offices;137 however, the right to speak
in favor of candidates that will be creating and enforcing the laws that
nonimmigrants are obligated to follow is far different. In fact, without a
vote, independent expenditures are the only way aliens can reasonably hope
to have “a meaningful voice in the political bargains that govern their
everyday lives.”138

134

See 558 U.S. at 362.
800 F. Supp. 2d at 289. As proof, the court cited a footnote in Bellotti supporting a ban on
corporate independent expenditures because they could lead to corruption. Id. at 290 (citing First Nat’l
Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978)). But that footnote was expressly overruled in
Citizens United. See 558 U.S. at 356–60. Moreover, Bellotti held that independent expenditures were
political speech and that spending money in order to effect speech does not change the fundamental
nature of political speech. See 435 U.S. at 777.
136
See 144 Cong. Rec. 5159 (Mar. 30, 1998) (Law Professors’ Letter on Campaign Finance
Reform and the Rights of Legal Permanent Residents) (“The right to vote and the right to speak on
political matters are, for constitutional purposes, distinct. . . . The right to speak is not limited to those
who have the right to vote. Everybody can participate in the marketplace of ideas regardless of whether
they can vote, and the voices of LPRs, like those of the members of every segment of our society, only
contribute to the variety that marketplace has offer.”); Eugene Volokh, Supreme Court Upholds Ban on
Candidate Campaign Contributions and Expenditures by Non-permanent-resident Foreign Citizens,
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 10, 2012, 6:57 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/01/10/supremecourt-upholds-ban-on-candidate-campaign-contributions-and-expenditures-by-non-permanent-residentforeign-citizens/ [http://perma.cc/ANS2-RMDM] (“[T]he right to speak about any subject—including
about candidates—using one’s own money (or the money that one’s organization has put at one’s
disposal) is indeed the exercise of free speech, and can’t be limited on the grounds that it constitutes
participation in elections. That one can’t participate in an election by voting shouldn’t stop one from
participating in public debate (including debate about who should be elected) by speaking.”); supra
notes 86–88.
137
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (Representatives must have been a citizen for at least seven
years); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (Senators must have been a citizen for at least nine years); U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (President must be a “natural born Citizen”).
138
David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights as Citizens?,
25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 375–76 (2003).
135
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Most importantly, Bluman’s sweeping embrace of stake’s importance
allowed the stake analysis to permeate First Amendment jurisprudence.
The court claimed the plaintiff’s concession that “the government may bar
foreign citizens abroad from making contributions or express-advocacy
expenditures in U.S. elections” proved the government could make
distinctions based on the speakers’ identity.139 But rather than confront the
issue about territoriality—and whether there was a constitutional difference
in restraining First Amendment rights based on the location of the
speaker—the court instead assumed that stake should determine First
Amendment protection.
Bluman further contended that § 441e’s exception permitting LPRs to
make expenditures was warranted because they have “a different
relationship to the American political community” than nonimmigrants
do.140 Specifically, LPRs “have a long-term stake in the flourishing of
American society, whereas temporary resident foreign citizens by
definition have only a short-term interest in the national community.”141
Because LPRs have a weightier stake, the court warned that extending the
ban to LPRs would “raise substantial questions” about its constitutionality
that were not present when only applied to nonimmigrants.142 Finally, the
court claimed that nonimmigrants have less of a stake because they “by
definition have primary loyalty to other national political communities.”143
B. The First Amendment and Stake Theory
Focusing on stake to determine an alien’s First Amendment protection
raises numerous problems, which Bluman glossed over: the stake theory
ignores the realities of an alien’s stake; applying the stake theory to
determine whether an alien is entitled to freedom of speech is incompatible
with the text and underlying values of the First Amendment; and finally, it
permits the government to restrict what information the citizenry can hear
from aliens present in the United States, thereby interfering with the
marketplace of ideas. This Section examines those problems.
1. Stake Analysis Versus Actual Stake.—First, because the stake
theory does not adequately assess an individual’s stake, constitutional
protection is provided based solely on the statutory classification that
Congress provides—not on the alien’s actual stake. As a consequence,
while aliens and citizens are obligated to follow the laws to the same
139

800 F. Supp. 2d at 289.
Id. at 290–91.
141
Id. at 291.
142
Id. at 292.
143
Id. at 291. The court did not address the fact that LPRs and nonimmigrants all have primary
loyalty to their country of citizenship.
140
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extent, nonimmigrants are not entitled to full constitutional protection.144
Moreover, “temporary” nonimmigrants are not really so temporary—and
although LPRs are entitled to stay here indefinitely, nothing requires that
they do.145
Additionally, many nonimmigrants are expressly permitted to have
dual intent, meaning they can come on a nonimmigrant visa while fully
intending to apply to become an LPR.146 Dual intent raises doubts about the
LPR–nonimmigrant distinction because it demonstrates that at least some
nonimmigrants intend to stay here permanently or at least long enough to
develop a sufficient stake and loyalty to the United States. Additionally,
aliens granted asylum are statutorily classified as nonimmigrants despite
being permitted to stay here indefinitely.147 Thus, nonimmigrants can be
here for many years and develop substantial connections to the United
States while on temporary visas. Under the stake theory it could be argued
that although a nonimmigrant may intend to become an LPR he has not
really put down sufficient roots to have a weighty stake. But under this
conception, an LPR who has just arrived is considered to have a weightier
144

James Madison pointed this out while arguing against the Alien and Sedition Acts, and his
argument is just as true today as it was then:
Again, it is said, that aliens not being parties to the Constitution, the rights and privileges
which it secures cannot be at all claimed by them. . . .
....
. . . [I]t does not follow, because aliens are not parties to the Constitution, as citizens are parties to
it, that, whilst they actually conform to it, they have no right to its protection. Aliens are not more
parties to the laws than they are parties to the Constitution; yet it will not be disputed that, as they
owe, on one hand, a temporary obedience, they are entitled, in return, to their protection and
advantage.
JAMES MADISON, Report on the Resolutions, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 341, 363
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906). Of course, there are other examples of limited constitutional protections for
people who must follow the law fully, such as convicted felons. However, nonimmigrants are denied
full constitutional protection not because of something they did but because of who they are—or more
accurately, because Congress classified them a certain way. This permits Congress to accord
constitutional protection based on the categories it creates, a proposition that is simply antithetical to a
democratic society. See infra notes 156–57 and accompanying text.
145
See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text. The two plaintiffs in Bluman exemplify why the
term “temporary” can be misleading: at the time of litigation, Bluman had been in the United States first
on a student visa and then on a three-year work visa that he planned on renewing for an additional three
years; Steiman had been here since 2009 on a three-year visa, which could be extended for up to seven
years. 800 F. Supp. 2d at 285. This also raises doubts about the court’s assertion that nonimmigrants,
but not LPRs, owe “primary loyalty” to other countries. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
146
See Brief of Amici Curiae the Ill. Coal. for Immigrant & Refugee Rights & the Nat’l Immigrant
Justice Ctr. in Support of Appellants at 14, Bluman v. FEC, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012) (No. 11-275) (citing
8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(e)(5), (h)(16)(i), (l)(16), (o)(13), (p)(15), (r)(15) (2011)). Dual intent may explain
why a 1996 audit of the labor certification program found that 99% of employment-based immigrant
visas were filled by aliens already in the United States. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., REP. NO. 06-96-002-03-321, THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR’S FOREIGN LABOR
CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS: THE SYSTEM IS BROKEN AND NEEDS TO BE FIXED 13 (1996).
147
8 C.F.R. § 208.14 (2014).
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stake than an alien on a nonimmigrant visa that has been present for six
years and fully intends to apply to become an LPR and stay permanently.
This only lends further credence to the criticism that the stake theory in fact
assesses statutory classification, not actual stake.148
It could be argued that instead of moving to a location-based approach
to aliens’ First Amendment rights, the stake analysis should be improved.
Instead of looking at statutory classification, courts could look at factors
such as the length of time an individual has been here, whether the
individual intends to reapply for a visa (or adjustment of status), and other
ties the individual has to the national community. Such an analysis,
however, would be extremely burdensome, fact-intensive, and subjective.
More importantly, even if an accurate stake analysis were developed the
stake theory is still ill-suited to the First Amendment.
These examples demonstrate that the stake analysis is not really an
assessment of an alien’s stake in the community, but rather an assessment
of his statutory classification. Thus, it is highly probable that this ban
unconstitutionally burdens the First Amendment rights of many
nonimmigrants, especially those on renewable visas that last many years,
and consequently have developed a weighty stake. This directly contradicts
the principle that “[t]he Government may not suppress lawful speech as the
means to suppress unlawful speech”149: “Protected speech does not become
unprotected merely because it resembles the latter. The Constitution
requires the reverse.”150
2. The First Amendment’s Text and Underlying Purpose.—Another
problem is that applying the stake theory to determine an alien’s First
Amendment rights is simply incompatible with the text and underlying
values of the First Amendment. The text of the First Amendment does not
support the view that only citizens—or even resident aliens—should be
entitled to its protection. Instead, it states “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”151 In fact, the
Amendment only mentions “the people” in the context of the right to
assemble and petition; thus it specifically grants “the people” the rights of
assembly and petition, but commands Congress to not “abridg[e] the

148

Cf. Foster, supra note 70, at 237–38.
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 475 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002)).
150
Id. (quoting Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 255); see also id. (“[The Court has] rejected the
argument that ‘protected speech may be banned as a means to ban unprotected speech,’ concluding that
it ‘turns the First Amendment upside down.’” (quoting Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 255)).
151
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).
149
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freedom of speech.”152 Consequently, the First Amendment should not be
interpreted as distinguishing between groups of people who should receive
freedom of speech.153
Bluman’s emphasis on stake further insinuates that freedom of speech
is not an inalienable right, but a mere privilege to be granted or denied by
the government, based on the alien’s statutory classification.154 In cases
regarding aliens’ rights, however, the Court has already “rejected the
concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit
is characterized as a ‘right’ or as a ‘privilege.’”155 Moreover, Bluman’s
stake-oriented analysis permits Congress to grant or deny First Amendment
protection based on statutory classifications, while at the same time being
granted the power to delineate those statutory classes.156 When freedom of
speech is determined by stake it means that Congress is permitted to deny
First Amendment rights to certain categories of people—by reference to the

152

Id. Of course, the First Amendment does not explicitly state that it only applies in the United
States either. However, the essence of the location theory is that only aliens within the jurisdiction are
entitled to the Constitution’s protection. By submitting to the authority of the jurisdiction when the alien
enters, he in turn is entitled to its protection. An alien outside the jurisdiction has not yet done so. The
Court has routinely held aliens outside the jurisdiction are not protected by the Constitution. See infra
note 177 and accompanying text.
153
See Underwager v. Channel 9 Austl., 69 F.3d 361, 365 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]here is no expressed
limitation as to whom the right of free speech applies.”); cf. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161
(1945) (Murphy, J., concurring) (“None of these provisions acknowledges any distinction between
citizens and resident aliens. They extend their inalienable privileges to all ‘persons’ and guard against
any encroachment on those rights by federal or state authority.”). This argument is even stronger when
applied to the First Amendment than it is to, for example, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, in which the
Court has interpreted the word “persons” to not be restricted to citizens. See supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
154
See Cole, supra note 138, at 386–87 (“[Aliens’] admission and continuing presence may be
conditioned on whatever constraints the government chooses to impose. . . . If you don’t like it, the
argument goes, either don’t come, or get out. This argument seeks to transform what we generally think
of as inalienable rights into discretionary privileges that can be granted or denied at will. It uses the fact
that a foreign national’s entry is a privilege to recast restrictions on his or her rights here as conditions
on the privilege of entry.”).
155
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); cf. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open
Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2328 (2013) (“[W]e have held that the Government ‘may not deny a
benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech even if
he has no entitlement to that benefit.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006))).
156
Thus the stake-based theory is implicitly premised on not just the idea that people get certain
constitutional rights based on their stake, but consequently, it also assumes that the Constitution does
not bind the government when it acts toward certain people within the jurisdiction. This is a dangerous
precedent—especially because Congress itself decides who can develop sufficient stakes. Cf. Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 737 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting) (suggesting “despotism exists”
when Congress can declare the limits of its own power).
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categories Congress created.157 This grant of power to determine
constitutional rights is simply antithetical to our democratic system.
Turning freedom of speech into a privilege also does not comport with
the understanding when the First Amendment was ratified that freedom of
speech was an inalienable right.158 The Framers “designed the Bill of Rights
to prohibit our Government from infringing rights and liberties presumed to
be pre-existing.”159 Thus, the First Amendment should be viewed “as a
limitation on the Government’s conduct with respect to all whom it seeks
to govern,” not a designation of the classes of people entitled to its
protection.160
By judicially limiting freedom of speech to citizens and LPRs, the
government has been granted far-reaching powers. Moreover, permitting
the implied plenary power to override the express prohibition on Congress
from abridging freedom of speech is simply illogical. As Justice Murphy
argued in Bridges v. Wixon:
[T]he First Amendment . . . make[s] no exception in favor of deportation laws
or laws enacted pursuant to a ‘plenary’ power of the Government. Hence the
very provisions of the Constitution negative the proposition that Congress, in
the exercise of a ‘plenary’ power, may override the rights of those who are
numbered among the beneficiaries of the Bill of Rights.161

Similarly, in Fong Yue Ting, Justice Brewer stressed that Congress was still
limited by the restrictions imposed in the Bill of Rights when employing
the express powers granted to it in the Constitution.162 To him, the
157

Professor David Cole advances another problem that arises when fundamental and inalienable
rights are limited instead of being granted to all persons. Specifically, he references Chief Justice
Taney’s reasoning in Dred Scott that because African-Americans were not considered citizens when the
Constitution was ratified they therefore “had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the
power and the Government might choose to grant them.” Cole, supra note 138, at 375 (quoting Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405 (1856)). Underscoring this, Professor Cole points to
Alexander Bickel’s warning that “Dred Scott teaches that ‘[a] relationship between government and the
governed that turns on citizenship can always be dissolved or denied [because] [c]itizenship is a legal
construct, an abstraction, a theory.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
MORALITY OF CONSENT 53 (1975)).
158
See id. at 372 (“[W]hen adopted, the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights were viewed not as
a set of optional contractual provisions enforceable because they were agreed upon by a group of states
and extending only to the contracting parties, but as inalienable natural rights that found their
provenance in God.”). To be clear, the argument is not that the Framers thought freedom of speech was
absolute, but rather that it was not a privilege.
159
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 288 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
160
Id.
161
326 U.S. 135, 162 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring).
162
149 U.S. 698, 738 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“Congress has supreme control over the
regulation of commerce, but if, in exercising that supreme control, it deems it necessary to take private
property, then it must proceed subject to the limitations imposed by this Fifth Amendment, and can take
only on payment of just compensation.” (quoting Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148
U.S. 312, 336 (1893))).
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comparison led to the conclusion that “if that be true of the powers
expressly granted, it must as certainly be true of those that are only granted
by implication.”163
3. Impact on Citizens’ First Amendment Rights.—One of the most
unfortunate consequences of the plenary power is that the Court ignores
how immigration laws implicate the rights of citizens.164 Stake analysis
compounds this in the context of the First Amendment: by making stake
necessary to enter the marketplace of ideas the government may now
determine who can enter it, in turn affecting the First Amendment rights of
citizens by determining what speech they are allowed to hear.165 An open
marketplace is essential because of our “profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open.”166 Section 441e and Bluman’s stake-based support, however,
suggest that the government, through its plenary power, may abridge
nonimmigrants’ right to freedom of speech, and citizens’ right to hear such
political speech from people present in the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.
Finally, harming a citizen’s right to hear certain speech has even
broader implications. When the Court condones the fact that “Congress
regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens,”167
163

Id. at 738; see also id. (“Even if it be among the powers implied, yet still it can be exercised
only in subordination to the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Constitution.”).
164
For example, in Fiallo v. Bell, the Court held that a statute permitting American citizens the
right to petition to bring their alien children to the United States, but which excluded fathers from
petitioning for illegitimate children, was constitutional despite the fact that “it infringes upon the
constitutional rights of citizens.” 430 U.S. 787, 798 (1977). The Court realized this was “admittedly the
consequence[]” of the provision, “but the decision nonetheless remains one ‘solely for the responsibility
of the Congress and wholly outside the power of this Court to control.’” Id. at 798–99 (quoting
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). Justice Marshall
explained why he dissented:
Today, however, the Court appears to hold that discrimination among citizens, however invidious
and irrational, must be tolerated if it occurs in the context of the immigration laws. Since I cannot
agree that Congress has license to deny fundamental rights to citizens according to the most
disfavored criteria simply because the Immigration and Nationality Act is involved, I dissent.
Id. at 800 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537,
550–52 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the Court’s decision upholding the exclusion
of an American citizen’s wife because of the plenary power ignored the rights of the citizen).
165
See supra notes 111–16 and accompanying text; see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310,
356 (2010) (“When Government seeks to use its full power, including the criminal law, to command
where a person may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses
censorship to control thought. This is unlawful. The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for
ourselves.”).
166
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). To be sure, even the location theory caps the marketplace at the border; the
difference is that the Constitution does not apply to aliens outside of the territorial jurisdiction. See infra
note 177.
167
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976).
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it sends an implicit message back to the citizenry and raises fears about
citizens’ constitutional rights.168 It is far from implausible that American
citizens’ actions could be chilled when they see the government punishing
people for engaging in what would be constitutionally protected conduct,
with the Court’s blessing.169 In the First Amendment context, this is
especially true. The First Amendment protects unpopular speech just as
much as popular speech; if the government is granted the power to deport
for unpopular speech—rather than leaving that speech to fail in the
marketplace of ideas—citizens holding those same unpopular views may be
chilled from speaking.170
C. Effects of Eliminating Stake Analysis in
First Amendment Jurisprudence
The foregoing analysis demonstrates the problems with requiring an
alien to show a stake in national society to receive First Amendment
protection. As a result, this Note proposes that all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction should be protected by the First Amendment.
Ultimately, this proposal extends not only to the right to make independent
expenditures, but also to freedom of speech in general and the
government’s deportation power when it is the result of speech protected
by the First Amendment.171
All aliens lawfully within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States should be entitled to First Amendment protection, including the right
to make independent expenditures and freedom of speech in general. The
independent expenditure ban “draws a highly questionable distinction
between political speech in a public forum and independent expenditures
on behalf of an electoral candidate.”172 The Court should not permit the
168

See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 761 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting) (“How far
will its legislation go? The unnaturalized resident feels it to-day, but if Congress can disregard the
guaranties with respect to any one domiciled in this country with its consent, it may disregard the
guaranties with respect to naturalized citizens.”).
169
James Madison made this argument when opposing the Alien and Sedition Acts. See MADISON,
supra note 144, at 331, 337 (“If a suspicion that aliens are dangerous constitute[s] the justification of
that power exercised over them by Congress, then a similar suspicion will justify the exercise of a
similar power over natives; because there is nothing in the Constitution distinguishing between the
power of a State to permit the residence of natives and of aliens.”). His argument is especially true
today because of the rise in immigration and the lightning speed with which knowledge spreads.
170
Cf. Stephen J. Burr, Immigration and the First Amendment, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1926
(1985).
171
It is important to emphasize that because speech protected by the First Amendment would be
protected to the same extent regardless of the speaker, speech not protected by the First Amendment
would not be protected regardless of the speaker. For a list of categories of unprotected speech, see
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
172
Massaro, supra note 100, at 684; see also id. at 681–82 (“[I]f the theoretical premises of
Citizens United hold, no sound or sufficient reason exists to distinguish between a sidewalk speech

237

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

government to criminally penalize speech based on the speaker’s identity
when that speaker is lawfully within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.
Until Bluman, the Court had never held that the speech of aliens
lawfully in the United States could be criminalized where it could not be if
spoken by citizens. However, it has held that aliens can be excluded for
speech—even where Congress could not criminally punish them—because
of the plenary power.173 For example, Kleindienst v. Mandel held that not
only can Congress categorically deny aliens the right to enter because of
speech,174 but also the Executive can deny a waiver to an alien forbidden to
enter by only providing a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason,”175 akin
to rational basis review despite the fundamental rights involved.176
Exclusion because of speech, though, was a consequence of the
premise that aliens not within the territorial jurisdiction are not protected by
the Constitution.177 The changes in IIRIRA to deportability and
inadmissibility mean that inadmissible aliens are within the jurisdiction;
whether an alien is subject to expedited removal or deportation, the

promoting or condemning an electoral candidate and an independent expenditure of funds to promote or
condemn the same candidate.”); Randy Boswell, Canadians Lose Fight to Spend Money on U.S.
POST
(Jan.
19,
2012,
7:17
PM),
Election
Campaigns,
NAT’L
http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/01/19/canadians-lose-fight-to-spend-money-on-u-s-electioncampaigns/ [http://perma.cc/ACK4-HZMQ] (asserting § 441e leads to the conclusion that, “I could,
theoretically, be breaking the law if I buy and wear a T-shirt with Obama’s face on it if the authorities
interpret that to mean I am attempting [to] influence how Americans vote. All this in the land that
invented free speech.” (quoting Benjamin Bluman)).
173
See Katherine L. Pringle, Note, Silencing the Speech of Strangers: Constitutional Values and
the First Amendment Rights of Resident Aliens, 81 GEO L.J. 2073, 2086 (1993) (“The Supreme Court
has subordinated aliens’ speech and association rights to the federal plenary power over immigration.
As a result, activities that the government cannot criminally punish by even a small fine, may be
punishable by immigration denials and ultimately by deportation.”).
174
See 408 U.S. 753, 766–67 (1972).
175
Id. at 770.
176
See Burr, supra note 170, at 1906 (“The Mandel facially legitimate and bona fide reason
standard might itself be better expressed as a rational basis test. The two standards are equivalent.”).
Burr later stated that this “deference standard . . . does not provide the protection for [F]irst
[A]mendment values in immigration cases that they receive in all other cases.” Id. at 1908.
177
See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“[A]n alien seeking initial admission to the
United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for the
power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative.”); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161
(1945) (Murphy, J., concurring) (“The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking admission
for the first time to these shores. But once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he
becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people without our borders.”); cf.
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 841–42 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“There is simply no support
for the Court’s assertion that constitutional rights extend to aliens held outside U.S. sovereign
territory . . . . [A]liens abroad have no substantive rights under our Constitution.”).
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consequences are the same—removal from the country that the alien has
made a home.178
The major case regarding deportation for speech, Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, held that an alien could be deported for being a member of
the Communist Party.179 As Professor Aleinikoff points out, however, the
case did not state that aliens were not protected by the First Amendment
but rather that the First Amendment did not protect advocacy inciting
violence.180
Indeed, the proposition that one has First Amendment rights while in
the country, except in deportation, is simply illogical because “[i]f a foreign
national has no First Amendment rights in the deportation setting, he has no
First Amendment rights anywhere; the fear of deportation will always and
everywhere restrict what he says.”181 Without the right to not be deported
for constitutionally protected speech, freedom of speech is meaningless.
The right to make independent expenditures, for example, would be a
Pyrrhic victory. Under current law, the courts would be powerless to stop a
newly elected President from deporting every nonimmigrant who made an
independent expenditure in support of his opponent, even if the
nonimmigrants could not be criminally prosecuted.182
The fact that deportation is not criminal punishment should not leave
the courts powerless.183 Because the effects of deportation are so harsh,
178

See supra notes 60–66 and accompanying text.
342 U.S. 580, 591–92 (1952).
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See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT’L
L. 862, 869 (1989) (“But read carefully, Harisiades does not support the claim that the First
Amendment does not limit the deportation power. Nowhere does Justice Jackson’s majority opinion
suggest that the deportation of an alien for membership in the Communist Party raises no First
Amendment issue. Rather, the opinion sustains the statutory provision by relying, in summary fashion,
upon the Court’s decision a year before in Dennis v. United States. . . . [R]ead properly, Harisiades
establishes that deportation grounds are to be judged by the same standard applied to other burdens on
First Amendment rights.”).
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Cole, supra note 138, at 377.
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Cf. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 162 (Murphy, J., concurring) (“The alien would be fully clothed with
his constitutional rights when defending himself in a court of law, but he would be stripped of those
rights when deportation officials encircle him.”); Aleinikoff, supra note 180, at 868 (“The legacies of
Fong Yue Ting and Wong Wing seem to have produced a curious paradox in constitutional law: an alien
can be deported for conduct for which, by dint of the First Amendment, he or she could not be
imprisoned. The impact of this anomaly is not restricted to the immigration context. Because
deportation is usually seen as a drastic penalty (at times, perhaps, more harsh than imprisonment),
aliens are likely to forgo speech condemned by the deportation provisions. The immigration statute
therefore chills the exercise of First Amendment rights outside the immigration context.”).
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See Bridges, 326 U.S. at 163–64 (“It is no answer that a deportation proceeding is technically
non-criminal in nature and that a deportable alien is not adjudged guilty of a ‘crime.’ Those are oversubtle niceties that shed their significance when we are concerned with safeguarding the ideals of the
Bill of Rights. The impact of deportation upon the life of an alien is often as great if not greater than the
imposition of a criminal sentence. A deported alien may lose his family, his friends and his livelihood
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permitting the government to deport an alien for constitutionally protected
speech effectively reverses the normal rule that Congress may not do
indirectly what it cannot do directly.184 As Justice Murphy contended, the
Framers did not “mean[] to make such an empty mockery of human
freedom.”185 Ultimately, by chilling the speech of aliens within our
borders—whether out of fear of criminal punishment or deportation—the
rights of all Americans are curtailed.186 Therefore, the plenary power should
not be able to override an alien’s First Amendment rights in the context of
deportation when the sole reason for deportation is constitutionally
protected speech.187
The prohibition on foreign nationals’ ability to make independent
expenditures is emblematic of the government’s actions toward aliens,
namely restricting their rights, and the Court’s reluctance to step in, instead
deferring to the plenary power. But the Court should not continue
sanctioning these actions and allowing an implied power to override
express restrictions.
For the first time, the Court affirmed the right of the federal
government to criminalize speech based solely on the speaker’s identity.
This is the complete opposite of its logic in Citizens United, in which the
Court quite forcefully stated:
By taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others, the
Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the right to use
speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker’s
voice. The Government may not by these means deprive the public of the right
and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of
consideration. The First Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the
ideas that flow from each.188

forever. Return to his native land may result in poverty, persecution and even death. There is thus no
justifiable reason for discarding the democratic and humane tenants of our legal system and descending
to the practices of despotism in dealing with deportation.”).
184
See id. at 162 (“Thus the Government would be precluded from enjoining or imprisoning an
alien for exercising his freedom of speech. But the Government at the same time would be free, from a
constitutional standpoint, to deport him for exercising that very same freedom.”).
185
Id.
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See id. at 166 (Stone, C.J., dissenting) (“The Bill of Rights belongs to [aliens] as well as to all
citizens. It protects them as long as they reside within the boundaries of our land. It protects them in the
exercise of the great individual rights necessary to a sound political and economic democracy. Neither
injunction, fine, imprisonment nor deportation can be utilized to restrict or prevent the exercise of
intellectual freedom. Only by zealously guarding the rights of the most humble, the most unorthodox
and the most despised among us can freedom flourish and endure in our land.”).
187
The Supreme Court has held that selective deportation based on activity protected by the First
Amendment is permissible if the alien is in violation of the immigration laws. See Reno v. Am.-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491–92 (1999). For a critique of this holding, see John A.
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558 U.S. 310, 340–41 (2010).

240

109:209 (2015)

What’s at Stake?

Many commentators have suggested that the Court reversed its logic as a
result of the reaction following Citizens United, fearful of provoking
another backlash.189 But the Court is the only resource for nonimmigrants:
they cannot vote and they are statutorily prohibited from making any
expenditure in elections that affect them just as much as citizens. Without
recourse to the political system—from which they are denied the right to
participate and speak about—the Court is the only branch that can protect
them.190
CONCLUSION
By requiring a stake to make independent expenditures, a right
protected by the First Amendment, the Court endorsed the view that the
only way to protect the Constitution and the ideals we cherish as
Americans is to systematically deny its protection to people lawfully
present in this country for the sole reason that they are statutorily classified
as one type of alien or another. However, this is a dangerous precedent to
set. As Thomas Jefferson argued, “[T]he friendless alien has indeed been
selected as the safest subject of a first experiment; but the citizen will soon
follow . . . .”191
Instead of requiring a certain level of stake to receive First
Amendment protection, a requirement that has no basis in the First
Amendment’s text or purpose, the Court should jealously guard the
inalienable rights enshrined in the Constitution. Ultimately, the Court
should analyze an alien’s First Amendment protections by location, not
stake, because it better reflects the text and underlying values of the First
Amendment and more fully protects the rights of both aliens and citizens.
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